I construct a tractable model to evaluate the liquidity shock hypothesis that exogenous shocks to equity market liquidity are an important cause of the business cycle. After calibrating the model, I find that a large and persistent negative liquidity shock can generate large drops in investment, employment and output. Contrary to the hypothesis, however, a negative liquidity shock generates an equity price boom. This counterfactual response of equity price is robust, provided that a negative liquidity shock tightens firms' financing constraint on investment. Also, I demonstrate that the same counterfactual response of equity price arises when there is a financial shock to a firm's collateral constraint on borrowing. For equity price to fall as it typically does in a recession, the negative liquidity/financial shock must be accompanied or caused by other changes that relax firms' financing constraint on investment. I discuss some candidates of these concurrent changes.
Introduction
The financial crisis in 2008 in the United States has brought asset market liquidity to the forefront of policy debate and academic research. The severe shortage of liquid assets during the height of the crisis prompted the US government to inject a massive amount of liquidity into the asset market, in various forms of bailouts and quantitative easing. There is little doubt that the liquidity shortage in that crisis was caused by changes in economic fundamentals. Specifically, the realization that many asset-backed securities had much lower quality and much higher default risks than previously thought triggered a flight of funds from those securities to safer and more liquid assets. Despite this critical role of the fundamentals, the crisis has raised a more general question about the role of asset market liquidity: Can exogenous shocks to such liquidity be an important cause of the business cycle?
An affirmative answer to this question is the basis of the following hypothesis, which I will refer to as the liquidity shock hypothesis. A sudden drop in asset market liquidity, which may not necessarily be related to changes in economic fundamentals, causes equity price to fall. In a world where firms face financing constraints on investment, this fall in equity price reduces the funds for investment that a firm can raise by issuing equity and/or using equity as collateral in borrowing. Thus, investment falls, output falls and an economic recession starts. The objective of this paper is to reformulate this hypothesis and evaluate it quantitatively.
The liquidity shock hypothesis has become popular in macroeconomic models that emphasize financial frictions (e.g., Moore, 2012, Jermann and Quadrini, 2010) . The intuitive appeal of the hypothesis comes partly from the link between investment and asset prices, which accords well with recent business cycles. Figure 1 depicts the time series of a broad stock price index and non-residential investment in the US from 1999 to 2011. The series are percentage deviations of the quarterly data from the trend, as signified by "dev" in the labels. 1 It is clear that investment and the stock price move closely together. More importantly, the stock price leads investment by one to two quarters in the business cycle. This lead-lag structure suggests that shocks might affect investment through asset prices. 1 The stock price index is the Wilshire 5000 price full cap index (Wilshire Associates Incorporated, also available at the Federal Reserve Data Center). This is an index of the market value of all stocks actively traded in the US, weighted by market capitalization. The designation "full cap" signifies a float adjusted market capitalization that includes shares of stocks not considered available to ordinary investors. The data is available on the daily basis, but the series used here is the price of the last trading day in each quarter. Investment is private nonresidential fixed investment, which is available at the US Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis. The variables in Figure 1 are quarterly data deflated with the GDP deflator, with the first quarter of year 2005 as the base period. They are filtered through the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a parameter 1600. I have multiplied the deviation of investment from its trend by 2.
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Besides its intuitive appeal, the liquidity shock hypothesis has immediate policy implications.
If fluctuations in asset liquidity are a cause of the business cycle, then a government can attenuate the business cycle by making the supply of liquid assets counter-cyclical. In particular, by injecting liquidity to support asset prices in a recession, a government can prevent business investment from deteriorating precipitously, thereby stabilizing the economy. Such interventions are warranted when exogenous shocks to asset liquidity are the source of fluctuations. I will show that a main result of this model also holds in many other models that emphasize the financing constraint on investment. KM place two equity-market frictions at the center. One is the difficulty to issue new equity: a firm can issue new equity on at most a fraction  ∈ (0 1) of investment. Another friction is the lack of resaleability of equity; that is, only a fraction  ∈ (0 1) of existing equity can be resold in any given period. KM model a liquidity shock as an exogenous and unexpected change in equity resaleability, .
I reformulate the KM model by assuming that each household consists of many members who perform different tasks in the market. While retaining the two equity market frictions in KM, this large-household construct simplifies the analysis significantly in two ways. First, it allows the use of a representative household which leads to straightforward aggregation of households'
decisions. In contrast, aggregation in KM is tractable only with logarithmic preferences. Second, the reformulation enables me to formulate an individual household's decision as a dynamic programming problem, rather than the sequence problem in KM. Dynamic programming leads to a construction of a recursive competitive equilibrium, which facilitates the analysis of how the liquidity shock works in a stochastic and dynamic environment.
Then I calibrate the model to evaluate the liquidity shock hypothesis quantitatively. Thecalibrated model shows that a strong and persistent negative liquidity shock generates large and persistent reductions in aggregate investment, employment and output. However, contrary to the liquidity shock hypothesis, the negative liquidity shock generates an asset price boom. Such a boom is rarely observed in economic recessions. This finding casts doubt on the liquidity shock hypothesis because, according to the hypothesis, a fall in equity price is the primer of the propagation of a negative liquidity shock.
The counterfactual response of equity price is not unique to the KM model or to the particular form of the liquidity shock. Rather, it is a general feature of many models where equity is important for financing investment. To demonstrate this generality, I introduce debt finance into the KM model and capture the indirect role that existing equity can help financing new investment by relaxing a firm's collateral constraint. Specifically, the amount that a firm can borrow is proportional to the value of the firm's holdings of resaleable assets at the end of a period.
Popularized by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Jermann and Quadrini (2010) , such a collateral constraint allows one to examine "financial shocks" that affect the ratio of a firm's borrowing capacity to the value of collateral. In this extension, a negative liquidity shock reduces both the amount of resaleable equity and the borrowing capacity. I show that a negative liquidity shock still increases equity price. Moreover, a negative financial shock alone also increases equity price, even when liquidity is fixed. In fact, all shocks that reduce firms' ability to finance investment tend to increase equity price.
The puzzling response of equity price to liquidity/financial shocks has a simple explanation.
Suppose that a negative shock of this type tightens the financing constraint on firm investment.
Then, the demand for, and the price of, liquid assets will rise, as long as investment projects are still attractive. Because the portion of equity that remains resaleable is liquid, its price will rise as well. In section 5, I will discuss some resolutions to the puzzle, all of which rely on direct or induced changes in effective productivity to accompany the liquidity shock.
Other authors have independently discovered the puzzling response of equity price to liquidity shocks. Nezafat and Slavik (2010) show that a negative shock to  increases equity price, and Ajello (2010) shows that a negative shock to  increases equity price. However, these authors do (2011) incorporate a range of elements into KM, such as wage/price rigidity, adjustment costs 3 in investment and habit persistence in consumption. These elements are intended to be realistic for addressing the issues in the two papers, but they cloud the picture of how liquidity shocks affect equity price. I simplify the KM model rather than complicate it. The simplified model enables me to clearly illustrate the counterfactual response of equity price to liquidity/financial shocks. In section 3.4, I will explain why adding the aforementioned elements to the model does not overturn the counterfactual response of equity price. The tractable formulation in my model should also be useful broadly for studying the role of the asset market in macro. 2 More generally, financial frictions have been the focus of business cycle research for quite some time. The literature is too large to be surveyed here (see Bernanke et al., 1999 , for a partial survey). One approach emphasizes the role of financial intermediaries in economizing on the cost of lending to and monitoring entrepreneurs who have private information on their projects'
outcome (see Townsend, 1979) . Williamson (1987) seems the first to use this approach to study the business cycle, and Gertler (1989, 1990 ) construct popular models along this line. The main mechanism in this approach is that net worth of entrepreneurs and/or financial intermediaries is pro-cyclical, which generates the financial multiplier. A related approach emphasizes a borrower's assets as collateral in securing debt when there is limited enforceability on debt repayment (see Kiyotaki 
A Macro Model with Asset Market Frictions

The model environment
Consider an infinite-horizon economy with discrete time. The economy is populated by a continuum of households, with measure one. Each household has a unit measure of members. At the beginning of each period, all members of a household are identical and share the household's assets. During the period, the members are separated from each other, and each member receives a shock that determines the role of the member in the period. A member will be an entrepreneur with probability  ∈ (0 1) and a worker with probability 1 − . These shocks are  among the members and across time. An entrepreneur has an investment project and no labor endowment, while a worker has one unit of labor endowment and no investment project. The members' 4 preferences are aggregated and represented by the following utility function of the household:
Here, the expectation is taken over aggregate shocks to ( ) which will be described below.
The variable    is an entrepreneur's consumption,    a worker's consumption, and   a worker's labor supply. The functions ,  and  are assumed to have standard properties. The household maximizes the above utility function by choosing the actions for the members, and the members implement these choices. In the presence of ex post heterogeneity among the individuals, this large household structure facilitates aggregation. 3 Let me describe the technologies in the economy together with the timing of events in an arbitrary period . The time subscript  is suppressed and the variables in period  ±  are given the subscript ±. A period is divided into four stages: households' decisions, production, investment, and consumption. In the stage of households' decisions, all members of a household are together to pool their assets. Aggregate shocks to ( ) are realized. 4 The household holds (physical) capital , equity claims , and liquid assets . Capital resides in the household and will be rented to firms in the second stage to produce consumption goods. On every unit of capital there is a claim which is either sold to the outsiders or retained by the household. Thus, a household holds a diversified portfolio of equity claims on the capital stock in the economy. 5 Liquid assets are government bonds. Because all members of the household are identical in this stage, the household evenly divides the assets among the members. The household also gives each member the instructions on the choices in the period contingent on whether the member will be an entrepreneur or a worker in the second stage. For an entrepreneur, the household instructs him to consume an amount   , invest , and hold a portfolio of equity and liquid assets (  +1    +1 ) at the end of the period. For a worker, the household instructs him to consume an amount   , supply labor , and hold a portfolio (  +1    +1 ) at the end of the period. After receiving these instructions, the members go to the market and will remain separated from each other until the beginning of the next period.
At the beginning of the production stage, each member receives the shock whose realization determines whether the individual is an entrepreneur or a worker. Competitive firms rent capital from the households and hire labor from workers to produce consumption goods according to
, where the superscript  indicates the demand. The function  has diminishing marginal productivity of each factor and constant returns to scale. Total factor productivity  follows a Markov process. After production, a worker receives wage income, and an individual who holds equity claims receives the rental income of capital. 6 Then, a fraction (1 − ) of existing capital depreciates, where  ∈ (0 1), and every existing equity claim is rescaled by a factor .
The third stage in the period is the investment stage where entrepreneurs seek finance and undertake investment projects. To simplify, I assume that all investment projects are identical and each project can transform any amount  ≥ 0 units of consumption goods into  units of new capital that will be added to next period's capital stock. In this stage, the asset market and the goods market are open. Individuals trade assets to finance new investments and to achieve the portfolio of asset holdings instructed earlier by their households.
In the final stage of the period, a worker consumes   and an entrepreneur consumes   . Then, individuals return to their households, arriving at the beginning of the next period.
There are two frictions in the equity market, as emphasized by KM. The first is that an entrepreneur can issue equity in the market on at most a fraction  ∈ (0 1) of investment. The rest of the equity on new investment is retained temporarily by the entrepreneur's household.
The second friction is that an individual can sell at most a fraction  ∈ (0 1) of existing equity in a period. One may be able to explicitly specify the impediments in the asset market to generate these bounds endogenously. 7 As a first pass, however, I take  and  as exogenous, as KM did.
Also following KM, I focus on equity resaleability  by assuming that  follows a Markov process while  is fixed. Shocks to  are interpreted as shocks to equity liquidity.
The asset market frictions amount to putting a lower bound on an entrepreneur's equity holdings at the end of a period. Because of the bound on new equity issues, an entrepreneur must retain (1 − ) claims on the new capital formed by his investment. In addition, after capital depreciates, the entrepreneur has  claims on existing capital, of which the entrepreneur must hold onto at least the amount (1 − ). Thus, the entrepreneur's equity holdings at the end of the period,   +1 , must satisfy the following equity liquidity constraint:
For (2.1) to be binding, an entrepreneur must face a tight borrowing limit. I set this limit as zero for now, as in KM, and will introduce debt finance in section 4. Note that the borrowing constraint is enforced by temporary separation of the members from each other in a period. This separation ensures that a household cannot shift funds from its workers to its entrepreneurs in the investment stage to circumvent entrepreneurs' liquidity constraint. This role of temporary separation is similar to that in the literature of limited participation, e.g., Lucas (1990) .
Government policies are kept simple. In each period, the government spends  per household, redeems all matured bonds, and issues an amount  of new real bonds per household, where  and  are positive constants. The government collects lump-sum taxes  per household to balance the budget in each period. (If   0, they are transfers to the households.) Let   be the price of bonds. Then, the government budget constraint is
A household's decisions
In a period, a household chooses
) for each worker. In addition to the liquidity constraint, the household faces a resource constraint on each member. On an entrepreneur, the resource constraint is:
where  is the rental rate of capital and  the price of an equity claim, measured in consumption goods. This constraint is explained as follows. An entrepreneur has three items of expenditure:
consumption   , investment , and the tax liability  . The entrepreneur has three sources of funds to finance these expenditures. The first is the rental income of capital, . The second is the net receipt from trading liquid assets, ( −     +1 ), which is the amount obtained from redeeming matured bonds minus the amount spent on new bonds. The third is the net receipts from trading equity. After capital depreciates in the period, the entrepreneur holds  claims on existing equity. The entrepreneur's investment creates  units of new capital. There is one claim on each unit of new capital, which is either sold to other households or retained by the entrepreneur for the household. Thus, the entrepreneur's total holdings of equity claims are ( + ). Because the entrepreneur has to hold onto   +1 claims at the end of the period, the rest is sold to the market. Thus, the entrepreneur's net receipt from trading equity claims is ( +  −   +1 ). 8 I focus on the economy where the liquidity constraint (2.1) binds. 9 In this case, since an entrepreneur is constrained in the ability to finance investment, the entrepreneur will optimally push equity holdings at the end of the period to the minimum allowed by the liquidity constraint, and liquid asset holdings to zero. That is,   +1 satisfies (2.1) with equality, and   +1 = 0. Substituting these quantities of (  +1    +1 ) into the entrepreneur's resource constraint, (2.3), I consolidate the entrepreneur's financing constraint as follows:
This financing constraint reveals two features. First, the resaleability of equity increases an entrepreneur's ability to finance investment. Second, an entrepreneur's "downpayment" on each unit A worker faces a resource constraint similar to (2.3), except that a worker has labor income and no investment project. Let  be the real wage rate. This constraint is:
A worker's equity holdings at the end of the period should also satisfy the constraint:   +1 ≥ (1 − ). However, this constraint is not binding because, in the equilibrium, workers are the buyers of the new and existing equity sold by entrepreneurs.
Denote average consumption per member in the household as  and the average holdings of the portfolio per member at the end of the period as ( +1   +1 ). Then,
Multiply (2.3) by  and (2.5) by 1 − . Adding up yields the household's resource constraint: 
, and the following constraints: provided by cash flows, measured in consumption units. As explained above, the liquidity constraint (2.1) binds if and only if    0. Moreover, the optimal choices of (    ) yield:
where the two inequalities in (2.12) hold with complementary slackness. 11 Condition (2.10) is the standard condition for optimal labor supply. Condition (2.11) captures the fact that a marginal unit of the resource is more valuable to an entrepreneur than to a worker if an entrepreneur's 10 As is standard, the price of equity is the so-called post-dividend price; i.e., it is measured after the rental income of capital is distributed to shareholders. 11 The constraints
financing constraint is binding, in which case the additional value to an entrepreneur is captured by    0 (  ). The conditions in (2.12) characterize the optimal choice of investment. As explained above, the downpayment on each unit of investment in terms of goods is 1 − , the cost of which in terms of utility is (1 − )   0 (  ). For the household, a unit of investment increases the resource by ( − 1), the benefit of which in terms of utility is ( − 1) 0 (  ). Investment is zero if the cost exceeds the benefit, and positive if the cost is equal to the benefit.
It is clear from (2.12) that the financing constraint is binding (i.e.,    0) if and only if 1    1. Note that the direct cost of replacing a unit of capital is one. Thus, when the financing constraint binds, equity price exceeds the replacement cost of capital, despite the absence of adjustment costs in investment. Intuitively, a binding constraint in financing investment creates an implicit cost that drives a wedge between equity price and the replacement cost of capital.
Finally, the optimality conditions on asset holdings at the end of the period and the envelope conditions on asset holdings together give rise to the asset-pricing equations below:
(2.14)
These asset-pricing equations incorporate liquidity services provided by the assets as implicit returns. The shadow price   +1 enters the right-hand sides of both pricing equations because existing equity and liquid assets can both be sold to raise funds for new investment, thereby relaxing the financing constraint on an entrepreneur. However, only a fraction  +1 of existing equity can be sold next period while all liquid assets can be sold. Thus,  +1 appears in the pricing equation for equity but not in that for liquid assets.
Definition of a recursive equilibrium
The formulation thus far suggests a straightforward definition of an equilibrium. Let K ⊂ R + be a compact set which contains all possible values of  and Z ⊂ R + ×[0,1] a compact set which contains all possible values of . Let C 1 be the set containing all continuous functions that map
into R + and C 3 the set containing all continuous functions that map
A recursive competitive equilibrium consists of asset and factor price functions (     )
, the value function  ∈ C 3 , the demand for factors by final-goods producers, (     ), and the law of motion of the aggregate capital stock that meet the following requirements:(i) Given price functions and the aggregate state, a household's value and policy functions solve a household's optimization problem in (2.8);
(ii) Given price functions and the aggregate state, factor demands satisfy
, where the subscripts of  indicate partial derivatives; (iii) Given the law of motion of the aggregate state, prices clear the markets:
labor:
The law of motion of the aggregate capital stock is consistent with the aggregation of individual households' choices:
Since the explanations for the requirements (i)-(iv) are straightforward, I only add the following clarifications. In the capital market clearing condition, the equality  =  states the fact that there are claims on all capital. In the equity market clearing condition, new equity claims are equal to new investment, , because  is defined to include not only equity claims sold in the market but also claims retained by the household. Condition (iv) is explicitly imposed here because it is needed for the households to compute the expectations in (2.8). However, because  = , the law of motion of the capital stock duplicates the equity market clearing conditiona reflection of the Walras' law.
Determining an equilibrium amounts to solving for asset price functions ( ) and   ( ).
Once these functions are determined, other equilibrium functions can be recovered from a household's first-order conditions, the Bellman equation in (2.8), the market clearing conditions and factor demand conditions. To solve for asset price functions, I can use the right-hand sides of the asset pricing equations, (2.13) and (2.14), to construct a mapping  that maps a pair of functions in C 1 back into C 1 (see Appendix A). The pair of functions (   ) in an equilibrium is a fixed point of  . I will implement this procedure numerically in subsection 3.1.
I relegate the discussion on the value of liquidity and the equity premium to Appendix B and the steady state to Appendix C. For comparative statics of the model, see Shi (2011).
Equilibrium Response to Shocks
I calibrate the model and examine how the equilibrium responds to equity liquidity shocks.
Calibration and computation
For the utility and production functions, I choose the following standard forms:
For the exogenous state of the economy ( ), I assume:
The superscript * indicates the non-stochastic steady state. These processes ensure  ≥ 0 and
. The quantitative analysis below will take   and   as one-time shocks.
I choose the length of a period to be one quarter and calibrate the non-stochastic steady state to the US data. The steady state and the calibration are described is Appendix C. The value of the discount factor  and the relative risk aversion are standard; so are the following targets and parameter values. The elasticity of labor supply is equal to two, and aggregate hours of work in the steady state are 025. The share of labor income in output is 1 −  = 064, the ratio of annual investment to capital in the steady state is 4(1 − ) = 0076, and the ratio of capital to annual output is 332. The steady state value of productivity is normalized to  * = 1 and the persistence of productivity is   = 095. Government spending  is set to be 18% of the steady state level of output. Note that the parameter  0 is identified by the ratio of capital to output because  0 affects entrepreneur's consumption which in turn affects the capital stock.
Let me discuss the remaining identification restrictions. First, the parameter  can be interpreted as the fraction of firms that adjust their capital in a period. The estimate of this fraction ranges from 020 (Doms and Dunne, 1998) to 040 (Cooper et al., 1999) annually. I choose a value 024 in this range, which leads to  = 006 quarterly. Second,  is set to be equal to  * as a benchmark. Third, liquidity shocks must be persistent in order to generate persistent effects. Some of the identified values are worth mentioning. First, equity resaleability in the steady state is  * = 0273. 13 Because this is significantly less than one, the resale market for equity is far from being liquid. Notice that  * is identified by the target that the annual yield on liquid assets is 002. If all assets were liquid, then the yield on liquid assets would be equal to the discount rate,  −14 − 1 = 00327. The difference between the yield on liquid assets and the discount rate is accounted for by the liquidity service performed by liquid assets. Second, the price of equity in the steady state is  * = 10367. Note that this value of  * satisfies 1   *  1, and so the financing constraint binds. Third, in the steady state, the rental rate of capital is  * = 00271 and the price of liquid assets is  *  = 09951. So, the annualized equity premium in the steady state is 12 Note that the pricing equation for liquid assets in the steady state imposes the constraint  *  ≥ . Thus, given the value of , the upper bound on the annual rate of return to liquid assets is  −4 − 1 = 00327. Thus, the value chosen for the rate of return to liquid assets is in this feasible region. 13 Nezafat and Slavik (2010) use the US Flow of Funds data for non-financial firms to estimate the stochastic process of . Interpreting  as the ratio of funds raised in the market to fixed investment, they find that the mean of  is 0284. This is close to the value  = 0273 that I use here. plausible explanation is that as the capital stock increases, the rental rate of capital falls which reduces equity price. On the price of liquid assets, a plausible explanation is that as the capital stock increases, the need for further investment falls, which reduces the demand for liquid assets.
Equilibrium response to an asset liquidity shock
Suppose that the economy is in the non-stochastic steady state at time  = 0. At the beginning of  = 1, there is an unanticipated drop in liquidity to 0221, a 19% drop from  * . After this shock,  follows the process in (3.2), with   = 0 for all  ≥ 2. To focus on this shock, let me assume for the moment that the fraction of new equity issuance, , and total factor productivity, , are fixed at their steady state levels. The dynamics are computed as in Appendix C. 14 shock is assumed to be persistent, the shock has persistent effects on investment. Three years after the shock, investment is still about 7% below the steady state. After period 1, however, the capital stock (not depicted) also falls below the steady state due to lower investment, which keeps output low. The responses of these aggregate variables are persistent. Three years after the shock, employment and output are still about 2% below the steady state. These responses of aggregate quantities seem to suggest that liquidity shocks to the equity market can potentially be an important cause of aggregate fluctuations. Instead of getting into this debate, let me check how asset prices respond to the liquidity shock. As Figure 2 .3 shows, a negative shock to equity liquidity generates an asset price boom! Immediately after the shock, equity price increases by 45% and the price of liquid assets increases by 05%.
Asset prices stay above the steady state for quite a long time. Three years after the shock, equity price is still 2% above the steady state. Thus, the negative liquidity shock to the asset market can generate large and persistent fluctuations in equity price, but the direction of this response
is opposite to what is conjectured by KM and opposite to what is observed in the data. One suspect is the fixed , the fraction of investment that can be financed by issuing new equity.
I will investigate the likely scenario that  falls with . Another suspect is that the model is too simplistic. By abstracting from many realistic elements, this model might have forced some variables to respond to the liquidity shock in the wrong magnitude or direction, in which case equity price might respond to the liquidity shock in the wrong direction in order to make up for the unrealistic responses in other variables. The following is a partial list of omitted elements: (i) wage rigidity: the absence of it in my model may imply that output does not fall enough after the negative liquidity shock;
(ii) habit persistence in consumption: the absence of this ingredient may imply that consumption responds to the liquidity shock by too much or in the wrong direction; (iii) adjustment costs of investment: the absence of these costs may imply that investment may fall by too much immediately after the negative liquidity shock.
These items are related. If the fall in output is sufficiently deficient and the fall in investment is sufficiently large, then consumption must increase after the negative liquidity shock in order to clear the goods market. In fact, after the negative liquidity shock described above, an entrepreneur's consumption falls, a worker's consumption increases, and aggregate consumption increases (not depicted here). Given this apparent defect of the model, one may be tempted to put items (i)-(iii) above into the model. 15 15 
Subsection 3.4 will show that large adjustment costs in investment can make aggregate consumption fall
Such an effort will be futile in overturning the positive response of equity price to a negative liquidity shock. So will be the effort of allowing  to fall together with the shock. To explain, let me examine the condition of optimal investment, (2.12). When investment is positive, this condition becomes:
Because this equation is central to the argument, let me repeat the meanings of the terms in it.
For each unit of capital formed by investment, the price is  and the direct marginal cost is one.
So, the benefit of investment is ( − 1). If there were no frictions in the equity market, investment Condition (3.3) provides a simple explanation for why asset prices increase after a negative liquidity shock. The condition contains only two variables, equity price  and the shadow price of the financing constraint,   . For any given   , the marginal benefit of investment is a strictly increasing function of  and the downpayment on investment a strictly decreasing function of .
As long as a negative liquidity shock reduces an entrepreneur's ability to finance the downpayment of investment, the shock tightens the financing constraint (2.4) and increases its shadow price   .
The higher   raises the implicit marginal cost of investment for any given equity price. To restore the balance between the marginal benefit and cost of investment, equity price must increase.
This explanation is general and can be phrased as a rule of thumb: Whenever a shock tightens the entrepreneur's financing constraint, all assets that can help raising funds for investment experience price gains because they become more valuable to the entrepreneur. The resaleable portion of equity is one such asset, and liquid assets are another. At the risk of over-simplification, let me phrase the result in terms of the demand for and the supply of equity. A reduction in equity resaleability reduces the supply of equity. In contrast, the demand for equity is not affected so much by the reduction, because there is no change to the quality of investment projects. As a result, the price of equity must increase to clear the equity market. With this generality, the argument can survive a wide range of variations/extensions of the model and the liquidity shock.
together with investment, employment and output in response to a negative liquidity shock. In the absence of adjustment costs, combined shocks to liquidity and productivity can also generate this positive comovement (see section 5). Ajello (2010) emphasizes the importance of nominal wage rigidity in producing this positive comovement in response to financial shocks when nominal prices are rigid.
I discuss some of these variations in the remainder of this section and the next section.
Consider first the plausible scenario that  falls with . This concurrent fall in  exacerbates the problem in the response of equity price to . Because the reduction in  further tightens an entrepreneur's financing constraint, it makes the resaleable portion of equity even more valuable than if  is fixed. This effect is clear from (3.3). For any given equity price and given , a fall in  increases the downpayment needed for each unit of investment, which increases the implicit marginal cost of investment. To restore the balance between the marginal benefit and cost of investment, equity price must rise even further after a negative liquidity shock. 16 Next, consider the large household construct used in this model. With this construct, entrepreneurs and workers in a household pool their assets at the beginning of each period, and so heterogeneity in asset holdings among individuals created by trade during a period lasts only for one period. Because this pooling allows entrepreneurs in the next period to use the assets accumulated by other members in the current period, it reduces the persistence of the negative liquidity shock on an entrepreneur's financing constraint. When such pooling is not allowed, as in KM, the financing constraint will be tighter, which will require equity price to increase by even more in response to a negative liquidity shock.
Another assumption in this model and in KM is that an entrepreneur has an immediate access to capital income in the period. That is, the income  is available for financing current investment, as can be seen from (2.3). One may consider the alternative timing according to which the income  is available only for financing consumption at the end of the period but not for financing investment in the current period. In this case, a fall in equity resaleability will tighten the financing constraint to a greater extent than it does in the current model and, hence, will increase equity price by even more.
Robustness to adding the usual elements
The usual elements considered in this subsection are wage rigidity, habit persistence in consumption, and adjustment costs in investment.
Wage rigidity and habit persistence do not directly affect the marginal benefit and cost of investment, as it is clear from (3.3). Their indirect effects may tighten the financing constraint, (2.4), even further and exacerbate the problem in the response of equity price to a liquidity shock. To see this, consider wage rigidity first. When there is a fall in equity liquidity, labor demand and, hence, output is likely to fall by more with rigid wages than with flexible wages.
As a result, the rental income of capital will fall by more when wages are rigid. Because capital income is part of the resource that an entrepreneur uses to finance investment, the financing constraint (2.4) becomes tighter, and so equity price rises by more with rigid wages than with flexible wages. Next consider habit persistence in consumption. When an entrepreneur cannot adjust consumption quickly because of habit persistence, the entrepreneur needs resource not only to finance investment but also to support persistently high consumption. Again, a negative liquidity shock will tighten the financing constraint (2.4) by more in this case than when there is no habit persistence, which requires equity price to increase by more.
In contrast to wage rigidity and habit persistence, adjustment costs in investment directly 
where I have substituted the result   = 1 + Ψ 0 ( * ).
Adjustment costs add two effects on optimal investment. One is the effect on   through the total downpayment, (  − ), and this effect is ambiguous analytically. On the one hand, adjustment costs prevent investment from falling by as much as in the baseline model. This has a positive effect on the total downpayment on investment. One the other hand, the presence of adjustment costs allows the replacement cost of capital (  ) to fall, which reduces the total downpayment. After a negative liquidity shock, the shadow price   increases by more with adjustment costs than in the baseline model if the total downpayment falls by less than in the baseline model. The second effect of adjustment costs is that the marginal cost of adjustment directly enters (3.4). For any given (   ), the marginal benefit of investment is a decreasing function of  and the marginal cost an increasing function of . When investment falls after a negative liquidity shock, the marginal adjustment cost falls, which reduces the replacement cost.
Such savings at the margin increase the net marginal benefit of investment for any given (   ) and mitigates the upward pressure on equity price caused by the increase in   .
Although the overall effect of adjustment costs on (3.4) is analytically ambiguous, the effect is unlikely to overturn the positive response of equity price to a negative liquidity shock. For the marginal savings from reduced investment to be significant, the marginal cost of adjustment, Ψ 0 , must be sufficiently steep, which implies that the reduction in investment must be sufficiently small. This implication may be inconsistent with the observed large reduction in investment at the beginning of a recession (see Figure 1) . Moreover, for equity price to fall with a negative liquidity shock, the savings from adjustment costs have to be so large that they wipe out the direct effect of the shock that tightens the financing constraint. This does not seem plausible.
For a concrete illustration, I set Ψ( show that equity price responds in such a counterfactual way to a broad set of financial shocks.
In particular, a negative shock that reduces the borrowing capacity also increases equity price, even when equity liquidity is fixed.
Suppose that individuals can borrow and lend through a perfectly competitive intermediary.
In a period, let   +1 be the amount borrowed by an entrepreneur and   +1 the amount borrowed by a worker. Define
as the amount of borrowing per member in the household. Such borrowing among the households should be distinguished from the borrowing between the government and the households, the latter of which is still denoted . Assume that borrowing is in the form of one-period debt. At the beginning of each period, the household pools all members' outstanding debts and divide them evenly among the members before they go to the market. During the period, each member repays the outstanding debt allocated to him. The amount of outstanding debt per member in the household at the beginning of the period is .
Let  be the gross interest rate on the outstanding debt and  +1 the rate on new debt. 19 For an entrepreneur, the net receipt from new borrowing minus the repayment on the outstanding debt is (  +1 − ), which is added to the resource side of the entrepreneur's resource constraint, (2.3). Similarly, the term (  +1 − ) is added to the resource side of a worker's resource constraint, (2.5), and the term ( +1 − ) to the resource side of a household's resource constraint, (2.7).
The liquidity constraint on an entrepreneur, (2.1), still applies.
The borrowing limit can depend on the asset value, as emphasized by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) . Specifically, because a borrower can renege on the repayment, a lender asks the borrower to put up collateral and is only willing to lend up to a fraction of the value of the collateral. For an entrepreneur, the collateral is equity holdings at the end of the period, whose value is   +1 . Let () be the fraction of this value that can be collateralized, which will be referred to as the collateral multiplier. Then, an entrepreneur's borrowing limit is:
The case  = 0 is the baseline model. The assumption   1 captures the fact that a borrower cannot borrow against the value of the entire asset holdings, partly because some of those assets are not immediately liquid. The assumption  0 () ≥ 0 captures the feature that a lender is willing to lend more if the borrower's collateral is more liquid, because the lender can sell the collateral in the market more easily in this case if the borrower defaults on the debt. 20 Although the collateral constraint is exogenously imposed here, I will remark later that endogenizing the constraint does not change the qualitative response of equity price to liquidity shocks.
Again, focus on the relevant case where the liquidity constraint, (2.1), is binding. Since   1, it can be verified that the collateral constraint, (4.1), also binds in this case. These binding constraints solve for (  +1    +1 ). Substituting these quantities into an entrepreneur's resource constraint, I obtain the following consolidated financing constraint on an entrepreneur:
This constraint modifies (2.4) as follows. First, there is repayment on the outstanding debt, . Second, the effective downpayment on each unit of investment is reduced from (1 − ) To check the quantitative response of the equilibrium to a negative liquidity shock, I specify the collateral multiplier as
where   1 is a constant. The assumption   1 is imposed to guarantee   1. However, I do 20 Note that a worker faces a similar constraint, ()
, but this constraint is not binding, because a worker is a lender in the equilibrium. not assume  ≥ 0. If   0, the debt limit is lower than the value of the part of the collateral that can be immediately sold. If   0, a borrower can borrow more than the value of this immediately liquid fraction of the collateral, possibly because a lender can sell the remaining fraction in the future. To identify , I use the micro evidence in Covas and den Haan (2011) who report the ratio of debt issuance to assets and the ratio of equity sales to assets in each period for US firms.
Dividing these two ratios yields the ratio of debt issuance to equity sales, denoted as . This ratio has large variations across firms and typically increases in firm size. I target the value for the bottom 50% firms, 1287, in order for the collateral constraint to be sufficiently binding. I identify  by equating  to the ratio of debt issuance to equity sales produced by the steady state of the model. 21 Although all of the calibration targets in Table 1 are kept, incorporating the collateral role of asset holdings changes some of the equilibrium conditions and, hence, some of the parameter values. The changes in the parameter values are:
The implied value of the collateral multiplier is ( * ) = 0173.
Suppose that the economy is in the steady state at  = 0 and there is a shock to liquidity at the beginning of  = 1 that reduces  from  * = 0118 to  1 = 0094. Figure 4 .1 depicts the dynamics of equity liquidity  and the collateral multiplier . The negative liquidity shock has large and persistent effects on the collateral multiplier. On impact of the shock, the collateral multiplier falls by 13%. Three years after the shock, the collateral multiplier is still 48% below the steady state. Figure 4 .2 depicts the responses of the prices of equity and liquid assets. As in the baseline model, a negative liquidity shock increases both prices. Also similar to the baseline model, investment and output fall (not depicted).
The positive response of equity price to a negative liquidity shock conforms with the rule of thumb described in subsection 3.3. That is, by tightening an entrepreneur's financing constraint, the shock makes the resaleable portion of equity more valuable. To see why this rule of thumb still applies in the presence of debt finance, let us examine the condition for optimal investment, which can be written as follows:
In the steady state, debt issuance by an entrepreneur in a period is equal to ( * ) *   * , where The amount of equity sold by an entrepreneur in a period is  *  * +  *  *  * . Thus,
As in the baseline model, the negative liquidity shock increases the implicit cost of investment through   by tightening an entrepreneur's financing constraint. In addition, the negative liquidity shock reduces the collateral multiplier (), which reduces the amount of borrowing by (1−).
As the downpayment on investment increases, an entrepreneur's financing constraint is tightened further. To keep investment optimal in this case, equity price must rise to increase the benefit of investment,  − 1, and to mitigate the increase in the downpayment. A notable special case of the above model is  = 0. In this case, an entrepreneur must finance investment entirely with debt and the receipts from selling existing assets, rather than issuing new equity to the market. Since all new equity is retained by the entrepreneur for the household for the period in this case, it helps financing investment only as collateral to secure borrowing.
Even in this case, a negative shock to liquidity generates an equity price boom.
Let me remark on the assumption  0 () ≥ 0 and the outcome of endogenizing the debt limit.
First, the assumption  0 () ≥ 0 captures the intuitive feature that a reduction in equity liquidity does not increase an entrepreneur's borrowing capacity. This intuitive feature is supported by the evidence documented by Covas and den Haan (2011) . Using micro data of US firms, they find that the ratio of debt finance to firm output is procyclical for an overwhelming majority of firms in the US. This suggests  0 () ≥ 0 if asset liquidity is procyclical. Second, because equity price increases in response to a negative liquidity shock when  0 () = 0, continuity implies that this positive response also arises even when  0 () is negative and sufficiently small. Third, endogenizing the debt limit will not overturn the positive response of equity price to a negative liquidity shock. Specifically, as long as the endogenous collateral limit has the realistic feature  0 () ≥ 0, the same mechanism as the above induces equity price to increase after a negative shock to equity liquidity.
The collateral constraint, (4.1), enables me to examine other financial shocks in addition to the liquidity shock. In particular, there can be shocks to the borrowing capacity that are unrelated to equity liquidity. For example, financial development and regulations can change the amount that an entrepreneur is able to leverage against the collateral even when the liquidity of the collateral remains unchanged. Such shocks can be modeled as shocks to  in (4.3). By examining how equity price responds to such financial shocks, I hope to illustrate the generality of this response.
To this end, let me assume that  obeys the following process:
where  * is the steady state of  and   1 is the lower bound of . This process ensures  ∈ [ 1). The identification procedure above for  implies  * = 0062. I set  = −01. reduces an entrepreneur's ability to borrow. Immediately after the shock, the collateral multiplierfalls by 16%. As the collateral multiplier falls, the prices of equity and liquid assets increase.
Again, this increase in equity price in response to the negative shock to  can be explained with (4.4) . By reducing the collateral multiplier, the negative shock to  increases the downpayment on investment and, hence, increases the implicit cost of investment. In addition, by tightening the financing constraint on an entrepreneur, the negative shock increases   , which further increases the implicit cost of investment. To make investment optimal, equity price must rise to increase the benefit of investment. This positive response of equity price to a negative shock to  provides another illustration of the simple rule of thumb described earlier.
Some Solutions to the Problem
I have shown that equity price increases in response to negative shocks to an entrepreneur's financing constraint, regardless of whether the shock is to the liquidity of assets or to the borrowing capacity. For equity price to fall after such a negative financing shock, as it often does during recessions, the financing constraint must become less tight. To generate this paradoxical outcome, there must be other changes concurrent with the financing shock that sufficiently reduce the need for investment. In this section I discuss some candidates of these concurrent changes and relate the analysis to other attempts in the literature.
One candidate is a perceived fall in the quality of capital, which can be caused by worsening adverse selection in the asset market (e.g., Kurlat, 2010) . If market participants perceive the quality of capital to deteriorate quickly in a recession, they will move resources from equity to relative safe and liquid assets. This will depress equity price and drive up the price of liquid assets. One way to model this shock is to assume that the effective capital stock is , where  is the quality of capital. The effective capital stock, instead of the raw capital stock, appears in the production function. Because total factor productivity is   , a negative shock to the quality of capital is similar to a negative shock to productivity , which I examine below. 23 Consider a negative shock to total factor productivity, . This shock reduces investment by reducing the marginal productivity of capital. If the shock is sufficiently persistent, then a household will also scale down consumption. These reductions in investment and consumption reduce an entrepreneur's expenditure, given by the right-hand side of the financing constraint (2.4). However, the negative shock to productivity may also reduce the rental income of capital, , which appears on the left-hand side of (2.4) . If the reductions in investment and consumption dominate the reduction in the rental income, then the financing constraint becomes less tight and, by (3.3), equity price falls.
As an illustration of this possibility, I return to the baseline model and compute the response of the equilibrium to simultaneous shocks to  and . Suppose that the economy is in the steady state before  = 1 and, at the beginning of  = 1, there are unanticipated reductions in  about 12% and in  about 5%. After these shocks,  and  follow the deterministic dynamics of the processes in (3.1) and (3.2) . Figure 6 depicts the responses of asset prices and the Lagrangian multiplier of the financing constraint, where the percentage change in   is rescaled by a factor 120. After the shocks, equity price falls and approaches the steady state from below. Supporting the above intuitive explanation, equity price falls because the negative productivity shock relaxes the financing constraint, as captured by the fall in   . Let me relate this analysis to some papers that generate a negative response of equity price to negative liquidity shocks. The KM paper proposes two ways to resolve the problematic response of equity price to the liquidity shock. One is to introduce a storage technology to allow entrepreneurs to shift resources between investment and storage. The analyses in sections 3 and 4 suggest that the role of storage will be limited. Since the condition of optimal investment, (3.3), must hold regardless of whether or not a storage technology exists, equity price will still increase after a negative liquidity shock as long as the shock tightens the financing constraint on investment. For storage to change the qualitative response of equity price, it must relax the financing constraint after a negative liquidity shock. This seems implausible. The other proposal is to assume that the government sells liquid assets to buy private equity in the event of a negative liquidity shock. If the injection of liquidity is sufficiently large that relaxes an entrepreneur's financing constraint, then it is not surprising from (3.3) that equity price will fall. This outcome illustrates an interesting role of government intervention in the asset market, but it does not negate the finding that a negative liquidity shock will push up equity price if it tightens the financing constraint.
Del Negro et al. (2011) introduce into KM an interest-rate policy rule and non-standard policy 28 interventions as well as the elements discussed in subsection 3.4. They suggest that a persistent negative liquidity shock may reduce equity price. Although it is not clear how this result can occur in their model, they seem to attribute it to an intricate interaction between nominal rigidities and the expectation of the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate under the described policy rule. As in KM, this analysis may be useful for understanding the role of government policy, but it does not contradict the finding that a pure negative liquidity shock increases equity price. In addition, as shown by Ajello (2010) (discussed below), nominal rigidities alone do not generate a negative response of equity price to a negative liquidity shock.
Ajello (2010) incorporates into KM nominal price/wage rigidities and the elements discussed in subsection 3.4. In addition, he makes investment projects heterogeneous in quality among entrepreneurs and the intermediation process costly to channel funds to investment. Despite all these elements, he still finds that a negative shock to  increases equity price, which is consistent with the analysis in subsection 3.4. He then illustrates that a shock that increases the cost of intermediation can reduce equity price and other aggregate quantities. By increasing the spread between the rates of return to an entrepreneur and the intermediary, the shock to intermediation affects the amount of funds that can be effectively channeled to investment and the quality distribution of investments that are undertaken in the equilibrium. As such, the intermediation shock acts as a negative shock to effective productivity, as well as to liquidity. It is then conceivable that such a negative shock can reduce equity price.
Jermann and Quadrini (2010) use a model that differs from KM in at least the following dimensions: (i) investment is undertaken by the same firms that produce consumption goods, rather than by a separate group of individuals called entrepreneurs; (ii) a firm needs working capital for all expenditures in a period, including wage payments, instead of just investment and consumption; and (iii) a firm faces a borrowing limit similar to the one in (4.1) where the financial shock is to  instead of . Despite all these differences, Jermann and Quadrini (2010) find that a negative shock to  increases equity price under the baseline calibration. They then illustrate that introducing sizable adjustment costs to investment can make equity price fall after a negative shock to . This result is surprising at first glance, given the analysis in section 4. However, a close inspection reveals that Jermann and Quadrini (2010) have estimated a vector autoregression (VAR) between  and total factor productivity. Because the off-diagonal elements in this VAR are non-zero, a negative shock to  acts as combined shocks to current liquidity and future productivity. Figure 6 illustrates that such combined shocks can reduce equity price. Jermann and Quadrini's result is instructive in revealing the importance of the inter-dependence between asset liquidity and productivity. However, this inter-dependence itself should be explained rather 29 than assumed in order to understand the role of liquidity shocks in the business cycle.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have constructed a tractable model to evaluate the liquidity shock hypothesis that exogenous shocks to equity market liquidity are an important cause of the business cycle. After calibrating the model to the US data and computing the dynamic equilibrium, I have found that a large and persistent negative liquidity shock can generate large drops in investment, employment and output. Contrary to the hypothesis, however, a negative liquidity shock generates an equity price boom. This counterfactual response of equity price is robust, provided that a negative liquidity shock tightens firms' financing constraints on investment. Also, I have demonstrated that the same counterfactual response of equity price arises when there is a financial shock to a collateral constraint that changes firms' borrowing capacity. For equity price to fall as it typically does in a recession, the negative liquidity/financial shock must be accompanied or caused by other shocks that reduce the need for investment sufficiently and relax firms' financing constraints on investment. I have discussed some candidates of these concurrent shocks, all of which can be traced to changes in factor productivity.
The main message of this analysis is not that asset liquidity is not important in general for the macro economy. Rather, the message is that exogenous shocks to asset liquidity alone fail to account for the cyclical movement of equity price. Despite the negative tone, this main result of the paper should be interpreted as being constructive, because it provides specific guidance to future research. If one wants to explain why changes in asset liquidity or the financing capacity play an important role in the business cycle, as they did in 2008, one should not follow the majority of macro models in this field to treat such changes as exogenous shocks that have no consequence on productivity. Instead, effort should be devoted to endogenizing a channel through which liquidity/financial shocks affect investment quality and effective productivity, as indicated by the VAR evidence in Jermann and Quadrini (2010) . In this regard, it may be particularly fruitful to incorporate information frictions, such as those in Chang (2010), Kurlat (2010) , and
Guerrieri and Shimer (2011), into dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. Setting total hours of work to the target yields (1−) * = 025. Given , this solves  * . Setting the ratio of capital to annual output in the steady state to the target yields  * (4 *  * ) = 332.
With the value of  identified above, this condition solves  * . Since  * =  *  0 1 , I can solve  * and recover  * = (1 − ) * . Also,  * =  *  0 2 . These values of ( *   *   * , *   * ) will be used to identify some parameters below. Since the ratio of government spending to output is ( *  * ) = 018, I can solve . Setting the annualized net rate of return to liquid assets to the target, I have 1( *  ) 4 − 1 = 002. This solves for  *  . Substituting  *  into the asset pricing equations in the steady state, (C.2) and (C.3), using the value of  * identified above, and using  =  * , I can solve  * ,  and  * . Using the target on the share of liquid assets, I have  *  ( *   +  *  * ) = 012. Because  *  ,  * and  * are all solved by now, this condition solves . Two parameters are still to be solved, ( 0   0 ). To solve them, I substitute the values of ( *   *   *   *   *   ) into the steady-state version of (2.4) to solve   * . The goods-market clearing condition yields  * =  *  * −  * − . Then, the definition of  yields   * = ( * −   * )(1 − ). Substituting the values of (  *   *   * ) into the steady-state version of (2.10), I obtain the value of  0 . Note that  *  0. Combining the steady-state versions of (2.11) and (2.12) to eliminate   * , I obtain an equation in which  0 is the only item still to be solved. Solve this equation for  0 . With ( 2   2 ), I repeat the process to obtain all equilibrium variables in period 2. Continuing this process yields the dynamic path of the equilibrium after the shocks.
